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Abstract: In August 2008, the FCC found that Comcast's restrictions on peer-to-peer 
upload transmissions were unreasonably discriminatory, arbitrarily targeted a particular 
application, and deprived consumers of their rights to run Internet applications and use 
services of their choice.  The Comcast ruling represents a significant change in the FCC's 
direction:  given the FCC's past decisions that broadband Internet access services do not 
fall within the "common carrier" category, it is notable that the agency has now imposed 
nondiscrimination requirements on these services.  This Article shows that the rationales 
articulated in the FCC's Comcast order, stressing both (i) concerns about protecting 
competition and (ii) concerns about  protecting consumers from disruption of their ability to 
communicate freely and privately, are rooted in centuries of Anglo-American law defining 
the obligations of "common carriers."  The FCC appears to be moving away from its 
traditional emphasis on the competition policy concerns, which justify asymmetrical 
regulation of dominant providers for the sake of enabling competition, and toward an 
emphasis on the consumer protection issues, which justify symmetrical regulation of all 
service providers regardless whether they have market power.  These developments in 
the U.S. echo the discussion now going on in Europe in the context of the package of 
proposals on a new common regulatory framework for telecommunications, released by 
the European Commission on Nov. 13, 2007, and which is now being debated by the 
European Parliament and Council. On both sides of the Atlantic, a trend is emerging to 
permit network discrimination only if the discrimination is narrowly tailored to achieve 
legitimate objectives. 
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he U.S. Federal Communications Commission's landmark ruling 
regarding Comcast's violation of network neutrality principles 1 could 
have profound effects on Internet operators' network management 
practices, not only in the U.S. but also in Europe and around the world.  The 
rationale articulated by the FCC is particularly instructive for European 
1 Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly 
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry Practices; Petition of Free Press et 
al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC's Internet 
Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for "Reasonable Network Management,"
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 FCC Rcd 13028 (released Aug. 20, 2008) ("Comcast 
Order"). 
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regulators and network operators, and has many points in common with 
proposed modifications to the European Framework Directive that would 
deal with "net freedoms." This major U.S. decision on network neutrality 
inevitably will affect developments in Europe (and elsewhere) due to the 
globalized nature of the Internet economy, just as ongoing policy decisions 
in Europe will affect developments in the U.S.  On both sides of the Atlantic, 
a consensus appears to be emerging among policymakers that 
discriminatory handling of different categories of Internet transmissions of 
applications will not be allowed unless it is narrowly tailored to achieve an 
important and legitimate objective.  Discrimination for anti-competitive 
purposes would be prohibited. 
  The Comcast Decision 
The facts in the Comcast case are well known.  Comcast is a cable 
television operator that offers its subscribers facilities-based broadband 
Internet access service.  The FCC found that Comcast, purportedly in order 
to control congestion on its last-mile access network, was blocking or 
delaying consumers' upload transmissions for peer-to-peer applications such 
as BitTorrent, by inserting false "reset packets" into the TCP transmission 
stream.  According to the FCC's ruling, Comcast did not disclose this 
practice to consumers or applications providers, and initially denied that it 
was doing so.  Moreover, the FCC concluded that Comcast was interfering 
with peer-to-peer uploads not only during periods of peak network traffic or 
in locations where congestion was occurring, but regardless of the location, 
level of congestion, or time of day.   
The FCC condemned this practice in a controversial order adopted by a 
narrow 3-2 vote, with Republican Chairman Kevin J. Martin joining the two 
Democratic commissioners in the majority, and the other two Republican 
commissioners dissenting.  In particular, the FCC majority concluded that 
Comcast's practice violated the principles set forth in the FCC's 2005 
Internet Policy Statement, 2 and that the FCC had authority to enforce these 
principles under the Communications Act of 1934.  According to the order, 
Comcast's practice of using "deep packet inspection" to determine whether 
transmissions are peer-to-peer uploads and use of "reset" packets to disrupt 
2 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Policy 
Statement, 20 FCC Rcd 14986 (2005) ("Internet Policy Statement").D. SIERADZKI & W. J. MAXWELL  75 
such connections was "invasive and outright discriminatory" because it 
arbitrarily and selectively targeted a particular application.  The FCC 
determined that this conduct deprived consumers of their rights to access 
the lawful Internet content of their choice and to run applications and use 
services of their choice.  The Commission stated that, in order to show that 
such a practice constitutes "reasonable network management," an Internet 
service provider has the burden of proving that "its practice should further a 
critically important interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 3
While the FCC did not dispute that easing network congestion is a critically 
important interest, it found that Comcast's practice was not minimally 
intrusive, and therefore declared it unlawful. 
The Comcast decision represents an extraordinary change of direction in 
FCC policy.  The FCC had previously determined that broadband Internet 
access service, whether provided by cable operators or telephone 
companies, falls into the category of "information service" that is not subject 
to the "common carrier" requirements of the Communications Act that apply 
to "telecommunications service." 4  The core obligation of common carriers 
is the obligation not to engage in unreasonable discrimination.  Over the past 
decade, the FCC has determined that cable operators are not subject to 
such common carrier obligations when they provide broadband Internet 
access service,  5 and removed or relaxed most of the anti-discrimination 
requirements, such as unbundling and "open network architecture," that 
formerly applied to incumbent local exchange carriers' (ILECs') provision of 
broadband transmission. 6  The four principles in the FCC's 2005 Internet
Policy Statement pointedly did not specify a nondiscrimination obligation for 
Internet service providers – and was criticized on that basis. 7
3 Comcast Order, ¶ 47. 
4 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(20) (definition of "information service"), 153(10) (definition of "common 
carrier"), 153(43) (definition of "telecommunications"), and 153(46) (definition of 
"telecommunications service"). 
5 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; 
Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband 
Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling, 17 FCC Rcd 4798 (2002), aff'd, 
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
6 See, e.g., Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline 
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ¶¶ 76, 79 (2005) ("Wireline 
Broadband Order"), aff'd, Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007). 
7 See, e.g., Comcast Order, Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, p.53 ("While today's 
Order represents important movement forward, it is not a full substitute for the fifth principle that 
I believe we must adopt.  A clearly-stated commitment of nondiscrimination would make clear 
that the Commission is not having a one-night stand with network neutrality, but an affair of the 
heart and a commitment for life.").  The four principles of the Internet Policy Statement are as 76     No. 72, 4
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Yet in the Comcast decision, while the FCC carefully avoided referring to 
Comcast's service as a "common carrier" telecommunications service, the 
main violation it identified was the operator's unreasonable and unjustified 
discrimination against users of peer-to-peer applications.  The FCC indicated 
that such discrimination was troubling for competitive reasons:  "Peer-to-
peer applications, including those relying on BitTorrent, have become a 
competitive threat to cable operators such as Comcast because Internet 
users have the opportunity to view high-quality video with Bit Torrent that 
they might otherwise watch (and pay for) on cable television." 8  In other 
words, in the FCC's view, Comcast's discriminatory conduct raised particular 
concerns relating to the company's vertical extension of market power – its 
abuse of control over the network access pipes to interfere with its 
competitors' ability to provide video-on-demand (VOD) services that 
competed with Comcast's own services.  Yet in the recent past the FCC has 
expressed confidence about the emergence of vigorous competition among 
broadband Internet access providers such as cable operators and telephone 
companies. 9
The FCC also appeared particularly troubled by the invasiveness of 
Comcast's conduct with regard to users' transmissions and Comcast's 
disruption of consumers' expectations of being able to access Internet 
applications and content of their choice.  The FCC compared the practice to 
a postal carrier who is expected to carry mail from one point to another, but 
who instead opens the mail and treats different packages differently based 
on the content.  "Comcast determines how it will route some connections 
based not on their destinations but on their contents; in laymen's terms, 
Comcast opens its customers' mail because it wants to deliver mail not 
based on the address or type of stamp on the envelope but on the type of 
letter contained therein." 10  FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, in his separate 
statement, appeared particularly disturbed by this invasion of customers' 
privacy:  "Would it be OK if the post office opened your mail, decided they 
didn't want to bother delivering it, and hid that fact by sending it back to you 
follows:  "To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and 
interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to [i] access the lawful 
Internet content of their choice; … [ii]  run applications and use services of their choice, subject 
to the needs of law enforcement; … [iii]  connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm 
the network; … [iv]  competition among network providers, application and service providers, 
and content providers.  The principles we adopt are subject to reasonable network 
management."  Internet Policy Statement, ¶ 4 & n.15 (emphasis in original). 
8 Comcast Order, ¶ 5. 
9 See, e.g., Wireline Broadband Order, ¶¶ 76, 79. 
10 Comcast Order, ¶ 41. D. SIERADZKI & W. J. MAXWELL  77 
stamped 'address unknown – return to sender'?"  11  The FCC also 
expressed irritation with Comcast's use of secretive and deceptive means to 
avoid disclosing its practice and the company's earlier false statements 
about the practice, and even cited one commenter who deemed the practice 
a "possible case of consumer fraud." 12
Comcast has appealed the decision on the ground that the FCC lacks 
legal authority to impose nondiscrimination requirements on entities that are 
not "common carrier" providers of telecommunications service.  (This view is 
echoed by the Republican FCC commissioners who dissented from the 
order.) 13  The FCC takes the position that it has "ancillary authority" to 
impose these requirements on non-common carriers. 14
Comcast also objects to the FCC's use of ex post adjudication here in the 
absence of any specific, enforceable ex ante rules defining what conduct is 
and is not permissible – or even clarifying whether non-common carriers 
may be subject to such rules.  The FCC defends its use of adjudication 
rather than regulatory rulemaking to enunciate and enforce new policies. 15
  "Common Carriage" and the rationale
for nondiscrimination regulation 
The FCC's rationale in the Comcast case requires a further examination 
of the concepts of common carriage and nondiscrimination in U.S. law and 
regulation.  The common carriage concept encompasses both (i) concerns 
over competition policy and (ii)  concerns over protecting consumers from 
disruption of their ability to communicate freely and invasion of their privacy.  
Common carriers are defined as entities that (i) hold out their services to the 
public for hire, without making individualized decisions whether and on what 
terms to deal, where (ii) such services constitute transmission only, without 
11 Comcast Order, Statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin, p. 38. 
12 Comcast Order, ¶ 46. 
13 See, e.g., Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Robert M. McDowell, pp. 61-63. 
14 Comcast Order, ¶¶ 14-22. 
15 ¶¶ 28-39. 78     No. 72, 4
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any interaction with the contents of the transmission. 16  Courts have held 
that "the primary sine qua non of common carrier status is a quasi-public 
character, which arises out of the undertaking to carry for all people 
indifferently;" and a "second prerequisite to common carrier status" is that 
"'customers transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing."  17
Thus, common carriers must be "common" – i.e., offer services to the public 
on a nondiscriminatory basis – and must be "carriers" – i.e., merely transmit 
data without acting upon, changing, or interfering with the content of the 
information received and delivered.   
Most U.S. regulatory policies over the past decades have been motivated 
by the first prong of the common carrier definition.  The FCC and other 
authorities have restricted unreasonable discrimination by common carriers 
due to concerns that dominant operators could harm competition by 
extending their significant market power (SMP) from their primary markets 
into vertical markets.  For example, a common carrier could use its leverage 
over the transmission facilities to discriminate in favor of its own content or 
applications (or those from a favored contract partner), and could 
discriminate against those of competitors, thus unfairly harming competition 
in the adjacent market.  Thus, as competition emerged in the provision of 
data-processing applications over communications networks in the early 
1980s, the FCC required the telecommunications common carriers (at the 
time, the Bell operating companies with monopolies over local transmission 
facilities) to make available "open network architecture" and "comparably 
efficient interconnection" to competing information service providers. 18
The second prong of the common carrier definition is sometimes 
overlooked, but is also critical.  It is the basis for the Communications Act's 
definitions that distinguish between "information service" (a "capability for 
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, 
or making available information via telecommunications") and 
"telecommunications" ("the transmission, between or among points specified 
16 National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) ("NARUC I"); National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC, 533 
F.2d 601, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("NARUC II"). 
17 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting 
NARUC II).
18 See, e.g., Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 77 
FCC 2d 384 (1980) ("Computer II"), aff'd, Computer & Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC,
693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and 
Regulations, 104 FCC 2d 158 (1986) ("Computer III"), vacated, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 
1217 (9
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by the user, or information of the user's choosing, without change in the form 
or content of the information as sent and received"). 19    
The obligation of "common carriers" to enable users to transmit the 
content of their own choosing and to avoid interfering with the content of 
users' transmissions has a long history not only in the regulatory context, but 
going back centuries in the Anglo-American legal system.  Historically, in the 
context of the law of bailments (the responsibility of persons entrusted with 
the goods of others), common carriers had a higher duty of care with respect 
to goods entrusted to them than other entities.  (Note that the term "common 
carriers" refers not only to entities that transmit telecommunications but also 
to entities that transmit goods, such as railroads and oil pipelines, and 
historically referred to operators of ferries and wagon delivery services.)   
Common "carriers" carried or moved goods from one place to another, and 
had an obligation to transport goods but not to "break bulk" – i.e., tamper 
with the goods entrusted to them.  Indeed, a common carrier could be 
subject to criminal liability for breaking bulk and misappropriating the goods 
inside. 20  Carriers had to "carry" the packets entrusted to them without 
opening them to inspect or act upon the content of the packets ("deep 
packet inspection" would have been unthinkable in that context!).  This 
concept carries forward into modern regulatory law in requirements that 
communications common carriers do not intercept, monitor or disclose the 
content of customers' calls except upon legal process from a law 
enforcement agency, as well as requirements that common carriers protect 
the privacy of customers' transmissions and other information.  21
Significantly, these obligations apply regardless whether or not the common 
carriers are monopolies or possess market power. 
19 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(20), 153(43). 
20 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, p.177 (1881) (Howe ed. 1963); A. Harding, A
Social History of English Law, p.310 (1966); Sir. William Jones, An Essay on the Law of 
Bailments (London, 1781) (3d ed., Nichols, ed., London 1823) (available in Library of Congress 
Law Library).  These sources cite Southcote v. Bennet (1601), Coggs v. Bernard (1705), and 
other English cases.  See also Bingham v. Cabbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19, 35 (1795) (statement of 
counsel for plaintiff in error discussing distinction between standards of care required of 
common carriers and those required of others). 
21 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18  U.S.C. §§  2510-2522; Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. 1001-1010; Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
§ 702 - Privacy of Customer Information (adding 47 U.S.C. § 222). 80     No. 72, 4
th Q. 2008 
  Asymmetrical regulation to protect competition
vs. symmetrical regulation to protect consumers 
The FCC's action against Comcast's discrimination against peer-to-peer 
applications appears to have been motivated in part by concerns over 
vertical competition, but perhaps even more critically by concerns over 
protecting consumers' ability to access the applications of their choice and 
prevent a network operator from interfering with those choices.  The FCC 
stressed the latter rationale in finding that "the company's discriminatory and 
arbitrary practices unduly squelches the dynamic benefits of an open and 
accessible Internet and does not constitute reasonable network 
management." 22
What roles do the nondiscrimination and "common carrier" concepts have 
in the broadband Internet world?  Network neutrality rules or other forms of 
regulation may be motivated, on the one hand, by concerns over abuse of 
market power by dominant operators that, unless controlled, would have the 
ability and incentive to harm competitors by leveraging their dominance over 
one market sector vertically into other related sectors.  On the other hand, 
regulation may be designed to protect consumers from unfair practices by 
network operators, especially intrusions into consumers' privacy or 
interference with the content of their communications.  The first of these 
concerns logically applies only to operators with market power.  Accordingly, 
as a conceptual matter, regulatory measures to address this concern should 
be applied "asymmetrically" only to dominant service providers and not to 
their competitors.  By contrast, the second issue – consumer protection – 
plausibly could apply "symmetrically" to all service providers, regardless 
whether they possess market power. 
The first of these rationales (market power) may justify economic 
regulation such as price controls and resale/unbundling obligations.  The 
FCC, however, has recently removed most price controls, unbundling 
obligations, and other forms of economic regulation that formerly applied 
"asymmetrically," only to incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) 
providing broadband Internet access transmission facilities.  23  Chairman 
22 Comcast Order, ¶ 1. 
23 See, e.g., Wireline Broadband Order; Unbundled Access to Network Elements; Review of 
the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 20 FCC Rcd 
2533 (2005) ("Triennial Review Remand Order"), aff'd, Covad Communications Corp. v. FCC,
450 F.3d 528 (2006); Petition of AT&T Inc. for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from D. SIERADZKI & W. J. MAXWELL  81 
Martin emphasized that the Comcast decision did "not address pricing, 
unbundling, or other economic regulation." 24  On the other hand, the FCC 
indicated that the Comcast ruling was consistent with prior FCC rulings that, 
even in the absence of market power, "we will not hesitate to adopt any non-
economic regulatory obligations that are necessary to ensure consumer 
protection and network security and reliability in this dynamically changing 
broadband era." 25  For example, in a recent line of decisions the FCC has 
imposed regulations regarding universal service payments, emergency 
dialing, assistance to law enforcement, customer privacy, numbering, 
disability access and other obligations "symmetrically" to all providers of 
voice telephony over the Internet (VoIP), regardless whether they possess 
market power. 26
It is also significant that the market power rationale is designed to protect 
competition, and indirectly competitors, as well as the consumers who 
benefit from a competitive marketplace.  By contrast, the drive to protect 
consumers' access to the content of their choice without interference by 
network operators only addresses the interests of consumers, not 
competitors.  The FCC's 2005 Internet Policy Statement focuses on 
consumers' entitlements to access content, run applications, connect 
devices, and benefit from competition – but does not explicitly mention the 
interests of competing service providers.  The Comcast decision mentions 
the competition issue, but as discussed above, focuses mainly on the 
consumer protection rationale.   
Title  II and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Its Broadband Services,  22 FCC Rcd 
18705 (2007). 
24 Comcast Order, Martin statement at 40. 
25 Comcast Order, ¶ 39 (emphasis added), quoting Wireline Broadband Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 
14915, ¶ 11. 
26 See, e.g., IP Enabled Services; E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers,
20  FCC Rcd 10245 (2005); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and 
Broadband Access and Services, 21 FCC Rcd 5360 (2006); Universal Service Contribution 
Methodology, 21 FCC Rcd 7518 (2006); Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996; Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and 
Other Customer Information 22 FCC Rcd 6927 (2007); IP-Enabled Services; Implementation of 
Sections 255 and 251(a)(2): Access to Telecommunications Service, Telecommunications 
Equipment and Customer Premises Equipment By Persons With Disabilities, 22  FCC Rcd 
11275 (2007). 82     No. 72, 4
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  U.S. and European approaches 
In that regard, it is interesting to compare U.S. and European 
approaches.  On Sept. 30, 2008, FCC Chairman Kevin Martin and EU 
Commissioner for Information Society and Media Viviane Reding appeared 
together as keynote speakers at a conference on network neutrality in 
Copenhagen.  Both leaders expressed strong support for maintaining an 
open and inclusive Internet, and both stated that government intervention 
will be necessary in some circumstances to prevent abusive or anti-
competitive conduct by network operators.  Chairman Martin reiterated the 
four consumer-based principles of the 2005 Internet Policy Statement, as 
well as the Comcast decision rooted in those principles. 27  Chairman Martin 
discussed consumers' rights to access applications and services, but did not 
address the interests of providers of applications or services.  On the other 
hand, Commissioner Reding emphasized her concern over the need "to 
ensure that the Internet remains open from the point of view of service 
providers wanting to deliver new, innovative services, AND open from the 
point of view of consumers wanting to access the services of their choice 
and create the content of their choice." 28   
In her speech, Commissioner Reding stated her belief that competitive 
forces and consumer demands would compel Internet service providers not 
to restrict consumers' choices, and stated that existing rules "already provide 
us with helpful tools to deal with uncompetitive situations, should these 
occur."  She also set forth her view that network management and traffic 
prioritization are legitimate and beneficial in many cases: 
"[t]he Commission's vision of an open and competitive digital market 
does allow for traffic prioritisation, especially for providing more 
innovative services or managing networks effectively. We have to allow 
network providers to experiment with different consumer offerings. In 
the end, it will be up to the consumers to decide to change to a 
provider that offers them what they would like."    
27 Chairman Kevin Martin, Keynote Remarks, Network Neutrality Conference – Implications for 
Innovation and Business Online (Copenhagen, Sept. 30, 2008), available at   
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-285830A1.pdf (as prepared for 
delivery).
28 Viviane Reding, EU Commissioner for Information Society and Media, "Network neutrality 
and Open Networks – Toward a European Approach," Network Neutrality Conference – 
Implications for Innovation and Business Online (Copenhagen, Sept. 30, 2008), available at  
http://www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/473&format=HTM
L&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN (as prepared for delivery) (emphasis in original). D. SIERADZKI & W. J. MAXWELL  83 
Her statements were consistent with the European Commission's 
relatively narrow proposals on this topic in its package of proposals on a new 
common regulatory framework for telecommunications, released on Nov. 13, 
2007.  The Commission's proposals include a statement echoing the FCC's 
2005 Internet Policy Statement: 
"End-users should be able to access and distribute any lawful content 
and use any lawful applications and/or services of their choice". 29
Also, the Commission's proposals would authorize the national regulatory 
authorities to prevent degradation of quality of service by setting minimum 
quality levels for network transmission services for end-users. Where 
appropriate, the Commission could adopt implementing measures to ensure 
a minimum level of harmonization in this area. 30  The package of proposals 
of the Commission must be adopted by the European Parliament and 
Council before they become new law.  
In its first reading, on September 24, 2008, the European Parliament 
voted for amendments that would authorize regulators to impose: 
  "[t]ransparency obligations on public communications network 
providers to ensure end-to-end connectivity, including unrestricted 
access to content, services and applications, . . . disclosure regarding 
restrictions on access to services and applications and regarding traffic 
management policies and, where necessary and proportionate, access 
by national regulatory authorities to such information needed to verify 
the accuracy of such disclosure." 31
Another amendment would require that "any restrictions to users' rights to 
access content, services and applications, if they are necessary, shall be 
implemented by appropriate measures, in accordance with the principles of 
proportionality, effectiveness and dissuasiveness." 32  Operators would also 
29 § 8.2b) of the Framework Directive, as revised by the proposed amendment. 
30 § 22 of the Directive on Universal Service, as revised by the proposed amendment. 
31 See European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 24 September 2008 on the proposal for a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2002/21/EC on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, Directive 
2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities, and Directive 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic 
communications networks and services (COM(2007)0697 – C6-0427/2007 – 2007/0247(COD)) 
(Codecision procedure: first reading), Amendment 121. 
32 28 2 a) of the Directive on Universal Service, as added by the proposed amendment. 84     No. 72, 4
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be required to provide clear information on possible restrictions of access to 
content and services, to enable end-users to make an informed choice. 33
These amendments' emphasis on transparency and disclosure of traffic 
management policies echoes the concerns expressed by the FCC in the 
Comcast decision over Comcast's lack of candor regarding its restrictions of 
peer-to-peer transmissions.  The emphasis on end-to-end connectivity and 
access to content, services, and applications is quite similar to the FCC's 
Internet policy principles.  In her Sept.  30 speech, Commissioner Reding 
commended the Parliament's action and did not take issue with the network 
neutrality amendments.  The ball is now in the court of the Council of 
Ministers, which will  review and perhaps modify the proposals in November.  
In the U.S., the FCC and Congress may well modify policies course 
following the 2008 Presidential elections.  Nonetheless, it seems clear that 
the approaches taken by U.S. and European policymakers are converging 
toward a net neutrality policy that emphasizes symmetric regulation 
designed to protect consumers, with a tolerance for network discrimination 
measures only to the extent that the measures are proportionate and seek to 
achieve a legitimate objective. 
  Implications of the Comcast Decision
for "reasonable network management" practices 
The FCC's Internet Policy Statement and the Comcast order recognize 
that network management is necessary and beneficial.  It is beyond doubt 
that all network operators, including providers of Internet access facilities as 
well as operators of IP "backbone" transmission deeper in the network, must 
engage in network planning, monitoring traffic flows, dynamically routing 
traffic to achieve load balancing, prioritizing certain traffic, and controlling 
network security.  But the Comcast decision breaks new ground in defining 
which network management practices will be considered "reasonable" and 
ordering an end to practices deemed to be "unreasonable."  The FCC held 
that, while controlling traffic flows to ease network congestion is not 
objectionable in itself, it was unreasonable for Comcast to do so by detecting 
peer-to-peer uploads and sending TCP "reset" packets to interrupt such 
transmissions.  The FCC ruled that by doing so, Comcast had unreasonably 
33 21 of the Directive on Universal Service, as revised by the proposed amendment. D. SIERADZKI & W. J. MAXWELL  85 
discriminated against a particular type of Internet application.  Comcast's 
failure to disclose this practice – i.e., its lack of transparency – further 
compounded the harm, according to the FCC. 
The burden of proof articulated by the FCC will be influential in future 
decisions involving different network management practices in the U.S., 
Europe, and elsewhere.  The FCC held that, in cases where network 
operators apply disparate treatment upon particular applications, the 
operator has the burden of demonstrating that the "practice should further a 
critically important interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 34
This raises a host of questions about what network management practices 
will be deemed reasonable in the future, and what network operators will 
need to demonstrate to prove that their conduct is "narrowly tailored" to 
serve a "critically important interest."   
Would Comcast's practices have been justifiable if Comcast had fully 
disclosed them to consumers and applications providers?  Presumably not:  
while the order stresses Comcast's failure to disclose its practices, it seems 
clear that some practices would be deemed unreasonable even if disclosed.  
The FCC held the practice itself to be unreasonable and ordered Comcast to 
end it, not just to disclose it.  Moreover, the disclosure of a network 
management practice in densely worded "terms of service" on a website 
may not satisfy the FCC's or other regulators' expectations, and it is not 
clear what type of disclosure would.   
The FCC found it was unreasonably discriminatory for Comcast to 
selectively block peer-to-peer uploads using TCP "reset" packets.  But would 
it have been reasonable for Comcast to have managed congestion by 
sending TCP "reset" packets to interrupt all high-bandwidth transmissions in 
a non-discriminatory manner, not just peer-to-peer uploads?  To what extent 
does the discrimination rationale really matter? 
Most significantly, the Comcast ruling begs the question of what types of 
conduct will be deemed unreasonably discriminatory.  In what circumstances 
may network operators prioritize certain types of traffic over others?  Some 
network neutrality advocates argue that it is inherently discriminatory for any 
types of traffic or applications to be prioritized, since giving a higher priority 
to some transmissions means that others will be given lower priority.  The 
Comcast case does not explicitly endorse this view; to the contrary, 
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Chairman Martin indicated that providers could legitimately prioritize VoIP 
calls. 35  However, the case leaves open the question of what showing 
network operators will need to make to demonstrate that prioritization is 
"narrowly tailored" to serve a "critically important interest."   
Is it unreasonable for a network operator to prioritize traffic where a 
particular content or applications provider has paid a premium amount for 
higher Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees?  Such practices are common 
today and could well become even more widespread in the future as 
applications are developed that require lower latency.  Will the uncertainties 
generated by the Comcast decision hamper such developments?  Or can 
operators rely on Chairman Martin's statement that the decision does "not 
address pricing, unbundling, or other economic regulation?"  Could this be 
interpreted as an indication that discrimination involving blocking or 
interfering with traffic will not be tolerated, but that disparate pricing will be 
reviewed more leniently? 
In the Comcast case and the 2005 Madison River case 36 (the only other 
FCC determination regarding network management, focusing on the 
blocking of ports used for VoIP service), the FCC has examined network 
management practices only in the context of wired broadband Internet 
access "tails" reaching mass market consumers.  It is unclear whether the 
same principles apply to other types of network facilities or service providers.  
In the AT&T/BellSouth merger case, the merging parties were required to 
comply with the Internet Policy Statement, but enterprise managed IP 
services and Internet Protocol television services were specifically exempted 
from this obligation. 37  A broad dispute (beyond the scope of this article) is 
now raging over whether and to what extent wireless services should be 
subject to network neutrality obligations. 
Does the nondiscrimination obligation in the Comcast case imply that 
network neutrality or nondiscrimination obligations could be extended to 
Internet backbone transmission operators at a higher level in the network?  
35 Id., Martin statement, p. 40. 
36 Madison River LLC and Affiliated Companies, Consent Decree, 20  FCC Rcd 4295 
(Enforcement Bur. 2005). 
37 AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp. Application for Transfer of Control, 22 FCC Rcd 5562, 
Appendix F, slip op. p.154 (2007) ("AT&T/BellSouth"). See also SBC Communications Inc. and 
AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, 20 FCC Rcd 18290, Appendix F, 
slip op. p. 125 (2005) ("SBC/AT&T") (imposing network neutrality condition with no carve-out); 
Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, 20 
FCC Rcd 18433, Appendix F, slip op. p. 130 (2005) ("Verizon/MCI") (same). D. SIERADZKI & W. J. MAXWELL  87 
Will peering arrangements and other forms of Internet backbone 
interconnection now be subject to regulatory scrutiny?  Will operators be 
called upon to provide justification to the FCC if they provide more favorable 
arrangements to some interconnecting networks (i.e., peering exchange of 
traffic with no charge) and less favorable arrangements to others (i.e.,
interconnection fees)?  To what extent will the non-discrimination argument 
become a source of leverage for smaller operators in negotiations over 
peering arrangements with larger backbone providers?  Significantly, in the 
AT&T/BellSouth, SBC/AT&T, and Verizon/MCI merger cases, the parties 
were required to maintain a specific number of discrete settlement-free 
peering arrangements for Internet backbone services, due to concerns over 
vertical integration between ILECs and large Internet backbone operators. 38
In Europe, how will symmetric net neutrality obligations relate to 
asymmetric non-discrimination obligations imposed on SMP operators under 
article 10 of the Access Directive?  Will symmetric net neutrality regulations 
weaken the European philosophy that remedies should be imposed only 
where market analysis reveals a competition problem? 
Chairman Martin emphasized in the Comcast case that the FCC's 
Internet principles do not protect "illegal content, such as child pornography 
or content that does not have the appropriate copyright." 39  This could be 
viewed as an invitation to network operators to screen for such illegal 
content and block it.  On the other hand, Chairman Martin expressed serious 
concerns about the reasonableness of "deep packet inspection" in the 
context of Comcast's practices.  Comcast used "deep packet inspection" to 
monitor customers' usage in order to control peer-to-peer uploads.  Martin 
compared "deep packet inspection" with the post office opening your mail 
and "looking inside its subscribers' communications (reading the 'packets' 
they send)"  – in other words, a problematic invasion of consumers' 
privacy. 40  Deep packet inspection is already used by operators to help 
identify applications that are to receive priority treatment in the context of 
corporate networks.  The idea of prioritizing certain traffic will become more 
and more prevalent with new generation networks that manage different 
qualities of service.  In new networks, deep packet inspection and 
prioritization of traffic will be commonplace. DPI has recently come under 
scrutiny in the U.S. Congress because of the technology's ability to detect 
38 AT&T/BellSouth, p.155; SBC/AT&T, p.124; Verizon/MCI, p. 130. 
39 Comcast Order, Martin statement, p. 39. 
40 Id., pp. 38, 40. 88     No. 72, 4
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particular websites and content consulted by end-users for purposes of 
behavioral advertising.  
The Comcast decision does not resolve the question of when "deep 
packet inspection" will be deemed reasonable or unreasonable.  What 
justification is needed to show that "deep packet inspection" is used in a 
"narrowly tailored" manner to serve a "critically important interest?"  Is it 
reasonable to invade customers' privacy when screening for child 
pornography or pirated content, but not when screening for disfavored 
applications?  Does it matter whether customers have given their consent to 
screening? This is closely related to questions in the U.S. and in Europe 
regarding behavioral advertising and targeting, as well as potential 
collaboration between Internet service providers and content providers to 
screen and block file transfers that violate copyright laws. 
  Conclusion 
While the FCC's Comcast decision and parallel initiatives by European 
policymakers have their roots in the historic obligations of "common 
carriers," the question of net neutrality and the right of operators to 
discriminate is now also very much linked to the right of the consumers to 
access content and services of their choice. Net neutrality can be viewed 
from the angle of asymmetric "SMP" regulation, designed to prevent anti-
competitive vertical leveraging, or from the angle of symmetric "consumer 
protection" regulation, designed to prevent undue limitation of consumer's 
choice.  The current tendency in the U.S. and Europe is to emphasize the 
symmetric, consumer protection angle.  On that front, there seems to be 
emerging a consensus that discrimination or prioritization measures would 
be tolerated only if they are narrowly tailored to achieve a legitimate 
objective.  Regulators will need to advance with care, however, when 
imposing symmetric remedies, so as not to invade the space of so-called 
"economic" remedies, which in Europe at least require a market analysis and 
identification of an operator with SMP before remedies can be imposed. Like 
any symmetric regulation, net neutrality rules may have a tendency to 
expand and creep into new areas previously more appropriately treated by 
asymmetric regulation. 